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Abstract
Modern network intrusion detection systems rely on machine learning tech-
niques to detect traﬃc anomalies and thus intruders. However, the ability to
learn the network behaviour in real-time comes at a cost: malicious software
can interfere with the learning process, and teach the intrusion detection sys-
tem to accept dangerous traﬃc. This paper presents an intrusion detection
system (IDS) that is able to detect common network attacks including but not
limited to, denial-of-service, bot nets, intrusions, and network scans. With the
help of the proposed example IDS, we show to what extent the training attack
(and more sophisticated variants of it) has an impact on machine-learning based
detection schemes, and how it can be detected.
Keywords: training attack, intrusion detection system, anomaly detection,
network security, machine learning
1. Introduction
Intrusion detection is a quite old research topic (the ﬁrst papers being pub-
lished in the 1980's [1] [2]), yet it still constitutes an actively researched domain
of computer security, especially in the ﬁeld of cyber-physical systems such as
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems or Advanced Me-
tering Infrastructures (AMI) [3]. Over the past few years, the increasing interest
in machine learning techniques led to the development of more sophisticated,
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so-called anomaly detection systems, which learn the `typical' behaviour of a
monitored network or system. That way, they are able to spot deviations from
the normal behaviour and thus, to a certain extent, detect previously unseen
attacks.
Given the fact that a lot of diﬀerent IDS strategies have been proposed over
the years [4] [5], it is important to choose the one that really suits the needs. For
instance, anomaly detection systems typically require the monitored network to
be suﬃciently static and predictable. While this is not necessarily the case
for arbitrary computer networks. cyber-physical systems usually do meet this
requirement, so a lot of research [3] has been conducted over the past few years
in developing and improving on intrusion detection techniques for cyber-physical
systems [6].
In addition, an automated learning system commonly requires a supervised
initial training phase, during which it is faced with (manually labelled) benign
and malicious data so that it learns the diﬀerence between these two data sets.
Naturally, for optimal results, the learning process should be carried out directly
in the target network, and not in a lab. Nevertheless, many researchers use
recorded data sets (such as the KDD'99 [7] data set) to evaluate the performance
of their anomaly detection algorithm. Unfortunately, the latter data sets are too
generic to be actually used to train and deploy an intrusion detection system in
a real network. This common practise can be explained by the fact that the used
protocols are often proprietary or unknown, and that the network infrastructure
is too complex, undocumented, or not available as a testing environment.
Moreover, an ideal intrusion detection system would spot undesirable content
without requiring a training phase, since it can then be directly deployed in
any production environment that is not known beforehand. In the machine-
learning domain, some schemes already exist which autonomously tell `normal'
data apart from outliers, and which are thus suitable for intrusion detection [8].
For our purposes, clustering-based schemes seem to be the most promising ones,
since they are unsupervised, relatively light-weight from a computation point of
view (which is important if one wishes to build a real-time intrusion detection
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system), and allow multiple behaviours to be modelled at the same time (in
contrast to Bayesian statistics, which merely splits the data into `normal' and
`abnormal'). Moreover, they yield comprehensible results, in contrast to e.g.
neural networks, where it is not so clear why they gave a certain output.
For machine-learning based intrusion detection techniques, a lot of research
has been made over the years, that increased their performance, their relia-
bility, and their scope. However, attacks are also becoming more and more
sophisticated. The most developed of them are referred to as advanced persis-
tent threats (APT): they cover all kind of hacking or spying activities that are
particularly stealthy and persistent [9]. Given the fact that most networks and
computer systems rely on anti-virus agents and intrusion detection systems, a
lot of money and eﬀort is put now into evading these security mechanisms [9].
Automated learning systems (and especially those that continuously adapt to
live data) are particularly aﬀected by this fact, because their learning process
can often be manipulated in such a way to make them progressively used to
malicious data. This process is referred to as the training attack.
It is virtually impossible to design an intrusion detection system that de-
fends against all modes of operation of APTs (and this is especially true when
they are targeted, and thus human-operated). Therefore, in order to better un-
derstand how stealthy and long-term attacks act on a computer network, this
paper focuses on a concrete example of an evasion technique that may be used
by an advanced persistent threat, namely the training attack. To the best of
our knowledge, very little research has been done to date, that analyses the
robustness of intrusion detection systems against such evasion techniques.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes related
work. In the following Sections 3 and 4 the threat model and the detection
strategies are discussed, respectively. In particular, our proposed IDS is outlined
in Section 4.3. The importance of the right parameter values is addressed in
Section 5, and their choice is evaluated in Section 6. The paper concludes with
Section 7.
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2. Related work
Several other authors have adopted the approach of applying clustering tech-
niques to a data stream collected from network (meta) data. A related area of
research is the realm of stream clustering algorithms, which are able to cluster
stream data (such as network meta data) on-the-ﬂy. A comprehensive state-of-
the-art has been recently composed by Ghesmoune et al. [10], and is out of the
scope for this paper. It is, however, not obvious how the resulting clusters can
be interpreted in terms of intrusions or anomalies, and the related research area
is also comparatively young.
For example, Tomlin et al. [11] propose an IDS based on k-means and fuzzy
cognitive maps (FCM) that is applied to security events of a power system.
They manage to improve on the detection accuracy of existing clustering-based
IDS, but they still require a training data set for initial learning.
Hendry et al. [12] do not design an intrusion detection system per se, but
they introduce an algorithm that uses data clustering to create attack signatures
from recorded data. Unfortunately the algorithm needs to pre-process the data
so that it cannot be used for on-line detection.
Similarly, Leung et al. [13] develop a density-based clustering algorithm
(called fpMAFIA), but it also requires a supervised learning session.
In contrast, Zhong et al. [14] use an on-line variant of the k-means algorithm
to group meta data of WLAN traﬃc into k clusters, for a ﬁxed k. Any data
point that is too far away from the center of the largest cluster, is considered an
anomaly. While this approach is completely unsupervised, it has comparatively
low detection rates of 65− 82%.
A similar approach is adopted by Alseiari et al. [15], who use a simpliﬁed k-
means variant (mini-batch k-means) to split smart meter readings into clusters;
if a cluster is smaller than a given ﬁxed value, it is considered anomalous. Most
interestingly, they also account for the clusters' evolution by applying a sliding
time window to the data. The authors claim to get slightly better detection
rates, but also admit that the reported results are sometimes unreliable (100%
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false positive rate) and that more research is needed to tackle the issue.
An emerging research topic deals with the problem of training attacks that
try to fool the intrusion detection systems by progressively manipulating the
data they monitor. Wagner and Soto [16] were the ﬁrst to raise awareness
about the issue; Barreno et al. [17] explored the topic in more detail for intrusion
detection systems.
Some authors focused on the related mimicry attack, which consists in evad-
ing the IDS, but not manipulating it permanently. Among them, Stevanovic et
al. [18] disseminate on real-world occurrences of mimicry attacks for the case of
anti-DDoS systems. The solution they propose consists in applying two inde-
pendent anomaly detection systems: one classical for DDoS detection, and one
which particularly focuses on mimicry attacks.
Yen et al. [19] describe an IDS which detects certain `stealthy' malware by
monitoring the similarity in behaviour of the hosts in a network. The authors
claim that using these techniques, they are able to tell genuine traﬃc apart
from mimicked one. The IDS has certain limitations though; for one, it can
only detect spreading malware, but not targeted attacks. Secondly, it partly
requires plain-text communication (for payload inspection).
3. Attack scenarios
There is no such thing as perfect security; intrusion detection systems cannot
detect all kinds of attacks, and will always make mistakes. Therefore it is
important to state precisely which attacks shall be detected by the IDS, and
which ones are not actively considered. The purpose of this section is to describe
the threat model that is targeted by our intrusion detection system.
First of all, our IDS is meant to be deployed in parallel to signature-based
detection engines (such as oﬀ-the-shelf anti-virus solutions), and will focus on
network attacks, only. Due to the expected mass of data, and due to the increas-
ing use of encryption in network streams, our IDS does not intend to inspect
the payload. Instead, it will examine the meta data obtained by modelling the
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`behaviour' of the network ﬂows.
3.1. Network attacks and induced anomalies
Many network attacks induce a change in the characteristics of a network
stream, that otherwise would not (or only under rare circumstances) occur.
The most prominent example is the distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack,
which consists in increasing the number of connections to a host, the amount
of data sent to a host, the frequency of connecting to a host, or possibly all of
them. Note how all of these can be measured independently of the used protocol
or of encryption.
Brute forcing is somewhat related, although its goal consists in gaining ele-
vated access rights, rather than bringing down a host. It operates similarly to
DDoS attacks, but in a less aggressive way (that is to say, with lower data rates
and less connections).
Another good example of abnormal behaviour is network scans. Whereas
they do not constitute an attack on their own, they still allow an attacker to
make out possible targets and collect information about open ports. In order to
launch such a scan, one unavoidably has to make a lot of out-going connections,
which are not usually seen on the network.
A fourth category covers all kinds of intrusion and routing attacks. They
primarily consist in deviating network streams to third parties (`men in the
middle'), who sniﬀ or manipulate the traﬃc. An IDS could detect such in-
truders by keeping track of the connectivity graph, listing all pairs of machines
that are known to communicate with each other. In cyber-physical systems,
many processes are regular and repetitive, so watching the timely behaviour of
connections might also reveal intruders.
Finally, a less frequent, yet important threat is computer worms. They
spread over the network by exploiting vulnerabilities of the host machines. De-
tecting them is not trivial at all, since the attack pattern depends a lot on the
actual exploit; in fact, a single network packet might even suﬃce, but it will go
completely unnoticed in the sheer mass of traﬃc in busy networks. However,
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Figure 1: Illustration of a typical denial-of-service attack. Note the abrupt `jumps' for the
measured data rate. This example is based on the data sets recorded by Garcia et al. [20].
sometimes worms use outdated or unused protocols, the mere presence of which
is already suspicious  in that case, a somewhat reliable detection is possible.
All of these threats have good chances to be discovered if one monitors
the network ﬂows between every two hosts, and watches out for deviations or
sudden changes in their behaviour. That behaviour is characterised exactly by
the meta data mentioned above. Following the research of Berthier et al. [21],
good candidates for being monitored include:
 the number of bytes transmitted over a certain time period (e.g. 10 sec-
onds);
 the average packet size;
 the number of concurrent connections;
 the pause since the last packet.
The ﬁrst two are somewhat related and allow the IDS to detect abuse of a
network service; the third one is speciﬁcally meant to detect distributed attacks;
the last one will aid in ﬁnding injected (irregular) packets.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the training attack over time, for the case of the data rate. An
attacker proceeds by progressively injecting more and more packets until he eventually reaches
the desired critical threshold.
3.2. Training attack
Once an intrusion system is in place and learns the typical behaviour of the
network, attackers can (and will) try to evade it. Among the evasion techniques
is (what we call) the training attack, that is closely related to mimicry and IDS
evasion attacks ([16, 17]). In contrast to the latter, it does not only consist in
hiding from the IDS, but also manipulates the IDS permanently. It does so by
injecting packets that progressively increase any of the monitored quantities,
until the target objective has been reached. That way, any future malicious
traﬃc is also considered as normal. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
The attack has been thoroughly discussed by Barreno et al. [17], who suggest
slowing down the learning process. Although this approach makes a training
attack exponentially harder, it will also render the IDS inert. This paper in-
troduces another strategy that does not suﬀer from this drawback; it is based
on the idea to also consider the long-term evolution of the monitored quantities
(see Section 4).
3.3. Stealthy training attack
The training attack consists in slowly shifting the network behaviour towards
a malicious state. While these progressive and slow changes are barely noticeable
in a short term, they become suddenly visible when looked at on a large time
scale. However, in order to cover up the training attack even in this scenario,
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Figure 3: Illustration of the stealthy training attack over time. Instead of only increasing the
traﬃc load, an attacker creates enough `normal' data in-between, which outweighs (and thus
hides) the malicious traﬃc.
an intruder can hide the malicious traﬃc by accompanying it with additional,
but normal data. So instead of shifting the behaviour towards a bad state,
he increases the spectrum of behaviours to additionally include the bad state.
Figure 3 illustrates this.
4. Intrusion detection techniques
Several techniques have been proposed for detecting network attacks. Sec-
tion 2 gives an overview of the state-of-the-art intrusion detection schemes.
4.1. Threshold and metric based
Among them, the most simple strategy is to ﬁx a threshold for the monitored
quantities in advance. It is to be noted that this approach is not based on
machine-learning, and thus requires a human to deﬁne the threshold(s) for each
and every ﬂow in the network. Moreover, such a system is completely inert to
changes in the network behaviour, so the thresholds need to be continuously
reviewed. This, however, makes the IDS also insensitive to the training attack.
Instead of ﬁxing the thresholds in advance, one could also learn them with
the aid of statistical quantities like average and variance. This solution is not as
simple as it seems, because it is not so clear what the precise threshold should
be. If one assumes that the network load follows a probabilistic distribution,
then one can compute the probability that a monitored quantity is according to
the probabilistic law, and conversely, if it deviates too much. For instance, for a
normally distributed quantity N (µ, σ2), 99.7% of all samples lie within µ± 3σ.
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Figure 4: Illustration of typical data rates for HTTP traﬃc (thin black line). Note how the
µ+ 3 · σ threshold value (thick red line) is not a good descriptor of `normal' traﬃc and thus a
bad candidate for detecting outliers in the traﬃc. This is due to the fact that HTTP traﬃc
is not even closely normally distributed.
Threshold-based approaches suﬀer from several drawbacks. For one, they do
not behave well with inhomogeneous traﬃc. Indeed, the data rate of a network
ﬂow is typically characterised by (at least) two states: an idling state where no
communication is made (so data rate 0), and an active state (with data rate
δ). Computing the statistical properties of these two states, one ends up with
an average data rate of something in-between, which does not yield the desired
threshold at all. Experiments suggest that the situation gets worse if more than
two states are involved: Figure 4 depicts the outcome of such an experiment
with real-world HTTP traﬃc (taken from [22]).
Other machine-learning approaches (including support vector machines and
regression methods) that reduce the data to a single metric value suﬀer from
the same issue, for the same reasons.
Second, like any criterion that involves the standard deviation σ of statistical
data, the strategy adopted here will encounter stability problems if the traﬃc
approaches constant behaviour (in which case the standard deviation σ is close
to zero). One can circumvent the issue by assuming a minimal value σ, but then
one has to fall back upon a hard coded parameter again.
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Third, this approach is vulnerable to the training attack: even when an
attacker uses the linearly increasing sequence of data points δt := a · t (for any
constant a > 0), a threshold-based IDS will not detect the attack. The proof
requires some tedious calculations and is therefore omitted, but one can readily
deduce from the deﬁnitions
µ(t) =
t∑
i=t−T
δi σ
2(t) =
1
T
·
t∑
i=t−T
(δi − µ)2
that indeed δt+1 < µ(t) + 3 · σ(t) for all t, so the IDS does not raise an alert
at any time. Here, T denotes the number of elements covered by the mean and
variance; its value does not have an inﬂuence on the statement.
4.2. Stream-clustering based
In contrast to many other machine learning techniques, stream clustering
algorithms support inhomogeneous traﬃc quite well, since they particularly aim
at learning the diﬀerent behavioural classes: from a sequence of data points, they
group similar (or close) ones together into a cluster.
Researchers have already put a lot of eﬀort into designing stream clustering
algorithms [23] that categorise data streams in real-time. The algorithm that
ﬁts the needs of our set-up best is D-Stream [24], since it is parameter-less and
supports arbitrarily-shaped clusters. It proceeds by dividing the state space into
a grid, and continuously computes the density of encountered data points per
grid cell. A cell is called dense if it contains a certain number of data points;
clusters are then deﬁned to be the connected components of dense cells. Figure 5
shows an example of such a grid; further details can be found in the original
paper by Chen et al. [24].
The clusters account for the several encountered classes of behaviour, whereas
outliers (data points which do not match any cluster) account for statistical ab-
normalities. It is important to observe that it is not the objective of the IDS to
detect the outliers, but changes in the behaviour of the network streams (which
manifest themselves by changes in the clusters).
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Figure 5: Example of a two-dimensional state space divided into a grid, at a particular time
t. Bullets denote data points; dense cells are hatched. In this example, there exist 4 clusters
at time t.
Udommanetanakit et al. [25] have extensively deliberated the possible op-
erations on the set of clusters and their implications. In short, there exist
ﬁve operations (appearance, disappearance, evolution, splitting, and merging of
clusters). Of those, an appearing cluster signals previously unseen behaviour,
which indicates an attack or intrusion. Stream clustering algorithms are typ-
ically able to detect new clusters in real-time, and are thus good candidates
for detecting the network attacks discussed in Section 3.1. Regarding the evo-
lution of clusters, the issue is trickier. Although such algorithms account for
changes in the input data, they cannot tell small ﬂuctuations (e.g. due to sta-
tistical abnormalities) from long-term evolutions of a cluster (e.g. caused by the
training attack). So, raising an alert whenever a cluster evolves either yields
too many false positives, or forces one to introduce a threshold value (which in
turn, requires expert knowledge).
In our work, we improve on existing stream clustering techniques to also
detect the training attack, without requiring any additional parameters to be
set.
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Figure 6: Work-ﬂow of the intrusion detection system.
4.3. Proposed IDS
The proposed network intrusion detection system (NIDS) operates passively
on the whole traﬃc of a network. It processes each ﬂow between any two hosts
in the networks independently, extracts the relevant features (see Section 3.1)
and applies clustering techniques to the latter. In this context, a ﬂow comprises
all network packets from all data streams sent from the ﬁrst peer to the second
one at a speciﬁc TCP/UDP port; for instance, the 〈10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2, 80〉 ﬂow
consists of the whole HTTP traﬃc between 10.0.0.1 and 10.0.0.2 (not just one
single HTTP connection).
Figure 6 shows the work ﬂow of the IDS. An alert is raised whenever a new
cluster is created.
The used data clustering algorithm is based on D-Stream [24]. It proceeds
by dividing the state space into a grid and keeps track of the density of recorded
data points for each obtained cell. The density includes an exponential decaying
over time, which enables the system to adapt to changes in the network. The
density dC(t) of a cell C at time t is deﬁned by
dC(t) =
∑
p: data point in C
λt−tp
where tp is the time when a data point p was recorded. 0 < λ < 1 is called the
decay parameter and controls how fast the IDS forgets old data. Following the
13
deﬁnition in [24], Section 3.2, a cell C is called dense at time t if
dC(t) ≥ Cm
N(1− λ) ,
where N is the total number of cells in the grid, and Cm is a ﬁxed constant.
The authors claim that Cm = 3 is a good choice; however, experiments (see
Section 6) and calculations (see Section 5.3) reveal that Cm := 10
−5 serves our
purposes much better. The huge diﬀerence can be explained by the fact that
they implicitly assume uniform background noise, whereas our data is locally
distributed with almost no noise. Finally, a cluster is a maximal connected
component of neighbouring dense cells.
The clustering algorithm consists of an on-line phase (during which the den-
sities are continuously updated) and an oﬀ-line phase (during which the clusters
are updated). In particular, alerts are raised only during the oﬀ-line phase, since
this is the only moment when new clusters may appear or evolve. The latter
phase is triggered at intervals of time Γ. In the following, Γ is referred to as the
clustering interval.
4.4. Detecting the training attack
Deployed as-is, the proposed IDS is still vulnerable to the training attack.
This is mainly due to the fact that it can only detect sudden changes at a certain
time scale (controlled by the λ and Γ parameters).
However, if several clones of the IDS are launched in parallel, with diﬀer-
ent λ and Γ parameters respectively, then each instance can detect changes at
a diﬀerent scale. When observed at short time periods, the subtle change in
behaviour caused by the training attack may be hard to detect. However, for
a diﬀerent instance that updates its clusters less often, the otherwise slow evo-
lution appears as a deletion together with a creation of a cluster, and is thus
detected  see Figure 7.
4.5. Detecting the stealthy training attack
The classic training attack consists in moving clusters; in contrast, the
stealthy version does not touch a cluster, but extends (enlarges) it in such a
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Figure 7: The several steps of the training attack and how they appear at diﬀerent time scales.
way that it also includes data points associated to malicious behaviour. Since
no new cluster is created, no alert will be raised, either  regardless of the time
granularity.
However, what does change is the size (number of covered cells) of the clus-
ters. Monitoring those sizes will allow the IDS to detect the stealthy training
attack, as well. One could now deﬁne a threshold size which a cluster should
not exceed, but there is a more elegant way. In fact, the same discussion as the
one on intrusion detection techniques above also applies here. So the preferred
solution is to apply yet another instance of our proposed IDS, but this time on
the output (that is, the size of the generated clusters) of the actual IDS. That
way, one truly obtains a `dual' IDS.
5. Choice of parameters
5.1. Decay parameter
The decay parameter 0 < λ < 1 inﬂuences the learning capabilities of the
IDS. The higher its value, the longer a data point will be `present' in the grid
cell. Recall that the weight of a data point within its cell decays exponentially
with time (t 7→ λt−t0). If λ = 0, learning will be completely disabled. Setting
λ = 1 will give every data point ever recorded the same weight, so the IDS will
always take the whole history into account when computing the clusters, and
never forget anything.
The exact choice of the parameter depends on the environment where the IDS
is deployed. In an ideal world, where the infrastructure and behaviours remain
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constant, one would indeed set λ := 1. Real-world set-ups are diﬀerent; devices
may join or leave the network, software updates may add new functionality
yielding a change in behaviour of the network streams, and so forth.
In order to determine a good value for λ, one needs to take into account
the estimated period T between (expected) signiﬁcant changes in the network.
Data older than T should rightfully be `forgotten' by the IDS. For cyber-physical
systems, this can be as large as three months. For home networks, several days
would be a more reasonable value. Proposition 1 provides a maximal value for
λ given T , which will be picked in the implementation of the IDS for optimal
results.
In the following, we deem that if a data point has ≤ 1% of the total weight
available, it is barely noticeable.
Proposition 1. Let T > 0. Let N be the number of grid cells. Suppose the
data points are recorded in regular time intervals. If λ ≤ 10−2/T , then all data
points older than T make up, in total, ≤ 1% of the whole weight available in the
grid.
Proof. Denote the length of the regular time intervals by f . The cumulative
weight of all data points ever recorded is
∞∑
i=0
λi·f =
1
1− λ.
Similarly, the cumulative weight of all data points older than T is
∞∑
i=T/f
λi·f = λT ·
∞∑
i=0
λi·f =
λT
1− λ.
By assumption, λT ≤ 1100 , which concludes the proof.
5.2. Clustering interval
The clustering interval parameter controls how often the data is clustered
and scanned for intrusions. If the interval is chosen too long, short-term attacks
go entirely unnoticed, since their footprint fades out before the clustering takes
place. If it is too short, the engine is unable to detect long-term evolutions.
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The strategy is thus two-fold. On the one hand, one needs to choose the
longest possible interval Γ so that all short-term attacks can still be noticed. On
the other hand, additional instances of the IDS (running with larger clustering
intervals, see Section 5.4) will make sure that long-term evolutions will not be
missed, either. Proposition 2 gives a hint on how to choose Γ for our purposes.
Proposition 2. Let Γ > 0 and 0 < p < 1. Let N be the number of grid cells.
Suppose the data points are recorded in regular time intervals. Assume λ = 1−ε
for some ε 1.
If Γ = Np , then any data point younger than Γ makes up at least a p part of the
weight gained by a cell on average during time Γ.
Proof. Denote the length of the regular time intervals by f . Then n := Γf data
points have been recorded after time Γ. Their cumulative weight is then
n−1∑
i=0
λi·f =
1− λf ·n
1− λ =
1− λΓ
1− λ =
1− exp (Γ lnλ)
1− λ .
If λ ≈ 1 then lnλ ≈ 0 and thus exp (Γ lnλ) ≈ 1 + Γ lnλ. Further ln(λ) =
ln(1− ε) ≈ −ε. Using this, one gets
1− exp (Γ lnλ)
1− λ ≈
−Γ · lnλ
1− λ ≈
Γ · ε
ε
= Γ.
Thus, the average weight gained by a cell is ≈ ΓN = 1p . The proportion of the
weight of any data point younger than Γ with respect to the average is at least
λΓ
1/p
≈ 1
1/p
= p.
Proposition 2 reveals that if the clustering interval Γ = 600s is chosen and the
state space is divided into N = 50 cells, then all data points recorded between
two oﬀ-line clustering processes will make out ΓN ≈ 8% of the average weight
gain of a cell. That is, each of those data points still has a considerable impact
on the weight of the cell.
Our experiments also conﬁrm that Γ = 600s = 10min is a good choice, see
Section 6.
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5.3. Density parameter
A cell C is deﬁned to be dense if dC(t) ≥ CmN(1−λ) . According to [24], a good
choice is Cm := 3, but this leads to no cell ever being marked as dense in our
set-up. This can be explained by the fact that they have much more data points
spread over the whole state space, whereas we deal with locally condensed data.
Proposition 3 suggests better values for Cm.
Proposition 3. Let Γ > 0 and Cm > 0. Let N be the number of grid cells.
Suppose the data points are recorded in regular time intervals. If Cm ≤ 1− λΓ,
then any cell that received at least the average weight during time Γ, is dense.
Proof. Denote the length of the regular time intervals by f . Then n := Γf data
points have been recorded after time Γ. Their cumulative weight is
n−1∑
i=0
λi·f =
1− λf ·n
1− λ =
1− λΓ
1− λ ,
so the average weight of a cell is 1−λ
Γ
N ·(1−λ) . If a cell C received at least the average
weight, then
dC(Γ) ≥ 1− λ
Γ
N · (1− λ) ≥
Cm
N · (1− λ) ,
so by deﬁnition, C is dense.
For instance, if λ = 0.011/1d and Γ = 10min, then Cm := 0.03 would be a
good choice. If λ = 0.011/30d and Γ = 10min, then opt for Cm := 0.001.
5.4. Detecting the training attack
To the clustering-based IDS, the classic training attack as described in Sec-
tion 3.2 appears initially as an enlargement of the cluster, followed by a splitting
into two clusters (see Figure 8). Note that these are two legitimate steps, so the
IDS will not raise any alert.
However, if the oﬀ-line clustering between those two steps were omitted,
the single resulting step would be correctly identiﬁed as malicious, since a new
cluster is created. The strategy is thus to apply an additional, independent
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Figure 8: The two (legitimate) steps that the training attack consists of. Dense cells are
hatched. If the intermediate clustering is omitted, the situation will look as if a new cluster
is created, and an alert will be raised.
clone of the IDS with clustering interval 2 ·Γ. Similarly, the argumentation can
be applied recursively on the second IDS to require a third one with clustering
interval 4 ·Γ, and so forth. Eventually they will cover a time span 2n ·Γ which is
so long that an attacker will not bother trying; for instance, if Γ equals 1 month,
and 50 years should be covered by the IDS, then one requires log2
(
50y
1m
) ≈ 9
instances.
The ﬁnal intrusion detection system thus consists of (for instance) 9 inde-
pendent instances, each invoked with a diﬀerent value for Γ. An alert by any
of these clones then results in an alert by the ﬁnal IDS. Since the clones are
independent, they can be run on diﬀerent CPUs or even on multiple devices 
no synchronisation is necessary. However, in order to avoid that multiple clones
are triggered by the same attack, one can account for only one alert within a
given time interval.
6. Evaluation
We ran several diﬀerent simulations on various data sets, including [22],
[26], and our own recordings. For all experiments that follow, the state space
(describing the data rate) is divided into a logarithmic scale of N = 50 values
ranging from 100 B/s to 109 B/s.
6.1. Detecting network attacks
The objective of the ﬁrst set of experiments is to verify if the proposed IDS
is actually able to detect classic network attacks (such as denial-of-service). As
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argued in Section 5.1, using a decay parameter of λ := 0.01−10 days guarantees
that any data encountered will be forgotten after roughly ten days. For the
clustering interval, we choose Γ = 10min.
Figure 9 depicts the simulation results on the data set [22], which contains 24
hours of network traﬃc produced by personal computers. As can be read oﬀ from
the ﬁgure, the traﬃc is relatively low most of the time, and sporadically features
small peaks (e.g. (1)(4) and (8) in Figure 9). However, most importantly, the
data sets also contains peaks (see (5), (6) and (7) in Figure 9) that may be
worth being investigated. The objective of the intrusion detection system is to
be able to detect this kind of change in behaviour.
Launching our IDS on the data set, we notice that at ﬁrst, several clusters
were created at the very beginning (which acts as a learning phase, so the alerts
were expected). The ﬁrst major peak ((5) in Figure 9) is correctly identiﬁed as
new behaviour, and so is the second one (6). The third peak (7) is classiﬁed to
be in the same cluster than the previous one, so no alert is raised. Any later
traﬃc matches the expectations of the IDS and does not lead to the creation of
new clusters.
If the decay parameter is too low, clustering information will be forgotten
too fast. Setting λ := 0.01−1 day will cause the IDS to forget data after roughly
one day, which is also what is observed in the 24-hour simulation depicted in
Figure 10. In fact, this experiment proves the soundness of the discussion on λ
conducted in Section 5.1.
6.2. Detecting the training attack
We were unaware of any data set that has recorded a training attack, and
thus had to create one on our own. For this purpose, the `4SIC Geek Lounge'
data set [27] describing 18 hours of real SCADA traﬃc has been extended (by
looping it) to a one-year period so as to obtain a good basis of `regular' data.
Figure 11 shows the content of the data set. Note that the two types of behaviour
clearly prove the applicability of our intrusion detection approach.
The IDS with parameters λ = 0.01−1/7days and Γ = 10min successfully
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Figure 9: Successful detection of unusually high out-going traﬃc for one of the hosts in the
[22] data set. The triangles denote the times when new clusters were created (thus alerts
raised). Below the ﬁgure, the clusters are explicitly drawn for the snapshots (1) to (8): boxes
represent the cells in the one-dimensional state space; black boxes denote dense cells.
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Figure 10: A small decay parameter (λ = 0.01−1 day) makes the IDS forget data too fast.
The triangles denote the times when new clusters were created (thus alerts raised); note the
additional ﬁnal clustering at the very right of the ﬁgure which occurs after approximately a
day.
learns the behaviour of the traﬃc, raising no alerts. Experiments show that
λ = 0.01−1/1day is too low (it yields false positives) and λ = 0.01−1/30days turns
out to be too long in the following discussion (the training attack does get
detected, but only after almost one year).
In parallel, we crafted artiﬁcial data packets with a slowly increasing packet
size and frequency, and merged the obtained packets with the real data set.
The resulting data set contains the recording of an artiﬁcial, yet theoretically
feasible training attack. The caused increase in the data rate roughly follows
an exponential law (t 7→ 1.1t).
Following the discussion in Section 5.4, several IDS instances are launched
on that data set, each of which has a clustering interval twice as large as the
previous one. In this use-case, it results in 16 instances ranging from Γ1 = 10min
to Γ16 = 228d. As expected, the ﬁrst few instances are unable to detect the
training attack. However, the long-term clones (Γ14,Γ15,Γ16) successfully raise
an alert after some initial learning phase  see Figure 12 for an illustration.
Two similar experiments have been conducted using a linearly increasing
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Figure 11: The `4SICS Geek Lounge' data set recorded on real SCADA equipment for 18
hours, starting at 5:52 p.m. One can clearly distinguish the night as a period of low activity
(7:42 p.m. to 8:30 a.m.).
data rate, and an initially increasing but eventually stagnating data rate. In
all cases, the longer-term instances were able to detect the attack, while the
shorter-term ones were not.
6.3. Detecting the stealthy training attack
A much more sophisticated version of the training attack consists in contin-
uously injecting the complete spectrum between normal and malicious traﬃc.
To do so, an attacker repetitively increases the data rate until a given threshold,
drops back to normal, and slowly increases again (see Figure 13). As predicted
in Section 3.3, simulations show that our IDS never creates a new cluster, but
increases the size of existing ones, instead; by consequence, no alert is raised
and the attack remains undetected.
As a counter-measure, we proposed to include the maximum cluster size in
the set of monitored quantities (in parallel with the data rate). In contrast to
previous simulations, where the maximum cluster size remained more or less
constant (it deviated by at most ±3), it increased by a decent amount in this
case. Indeed, applying the same detection techniques on the maximum cluster
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With Γ14 = 57d:
With Γ15 = 114d:
With Γ16 = 228d:
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Figure 12: The training attack combined with the [27] data set. The triangles denote the times
when new clusters were created (thus alerts raised) for the instances with Γ = 57d, 114d, 228d,
respectively.
size (thus, on the output of the actual IDS) yields the desired results  see
Figure 13.
7. Conclusion
This paper deliberates modern anomaly-based intrusion detection techniques
that learn the behaviour of network streams. It is to be noted that the former can
only reliably recognise attacks which induce a considerable change in behaviour
of the network. Traditional signature scanners perform much better when it
comes to detecting speciﬁc malware, and should be applied in parallel. While
state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems classify individual data packets as
good or malicious, the IDS proposed in this paper rather focuses on grouping
similar data packets and decides upon each cluster if it is normal or not. The
advantage of this approach is a more stable behaviour with respect to statistical
noise, since single outliers do not immediately yield a (false) alert. In addition,
the decision of the algorithm can be retraced more intuitively than for other
machine-learning based approaches.
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Figure 13: The stealthy training attack combined with the [27] data set. The right graph
depicts the data rate as induced by the attack, while the left graph depicts the evolution of
the cluster size. Although no alert is raised for the behaviour of the data rate, the dual IDS
does identify the increase of the cluster size (alerts marked with red triangles).
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This paper gives evidence that live learning systems can be tricked by in-
terfering with the learning process, and presents the so-called training attack
that makes such a system eventually accept malicious behaviour. We propose
a detection scheme that is, to a certain extent, resistant to this kind of attacks.
It consists in considering the input at multiple time resolutions, which consider-
ably hardens long-term changes in the behaviour. In order to provider a better
understanding of the consequences of a fooled IDS, we presented a stealthier
variant of said attack and discussed how to counter it. However, our research
only scratched the surface of possible tricking techniques, and there are probably
further opportunities for attackers to evade the IDS.
The solidity of our approach is validated, on the one hand, by a mathe-
matically sound choice of parameters, and on the other hand, by simulations
conducted on real network traﬃc from various sources.
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